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Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the ability of a risk arbitrage strategy 
to generate excess return, alpha, in the Swedish equity market  
 
Theoretical 
Perspective(s): A deductive approach, using widely accepted theories on arbitrage and financial 
markets to examine the ability of the strategy to generate excess returns. 
 
Empirical  
foundation: The sample portfolio includes a total of 111 deals, and the returns are computed 
for 2611 trading days, compounded into 132 monthly returns, from January 2000 
to December 2010. All deal data was retrieved from BvD Zephyr and all price 
data retrieved using ThomsonReuters Datastream. In addition, data for the SSVX 
90 day treasury bill was retrieved directly from the Swedish Central Bank. 
 
Conclusion: The strategy is found capable of generating significant excess return over the 
period evaluated, using both linear and non-linear evaluation methods. The alpha 
is 120 basis points per month, in a linear framework and assuming CAPM holds, 
and 51 basis points per month using a non-linear framework and assuming Black-
Scholes holds. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this first chapter I strive to introduce Risk Arbitrage as a concept and provide some relevant 
background information. I will also outline the purpose and limitations, as well as the problem 
formulation. 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
1.1.1. Risk Arbitrage – Definition and Introduction 
Arbitrage, from the Latin word „Arbitratus‟, meaning free choice, is a centuries old practice for 
the secrecy-shrouded community of arbitrageurs. To engage in the practice of arbitrage in its 
most simple form, one undertakes the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same security in 
different markets and at different prices, yielding a risk-free profit. This is arbitrage as it was 
originally practiced by Venetian merchants in Medieval Europe. (Wyser-Pratte, 2009, p. 1) The 
definition as per the Merriam-Webster‟s 11th College Dictionary follows: 
1. The nearly simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in different 
markets in order to profit from price discrepancies. 
2. The purchase of the stock of a takeover target especially with a view to selling it 
profitably to the raider. 
The first definition is the one I referred to as the simple one, and while it may have been viable 
in the 13
th
 century, it is rarely seen today, some nine hundred years later. 
Merriam-Websters second definition, although it somewhat resembles what I refer to as risk 
arbitrage, fails to properly capture the full nature of the practice of true arbitrage, and hence we 
will move further on to the definition as it is used by academia. Arbitrage as a theoretical concept 
is widely practiced by academia within the field of economics, and the law of one price is a 
cornerstone in the pricing of assets and their derivatives. The formalised definition of arbitrage in 
the academic sense is that of a self financing trading strategy generating a positive return without 
risk, i.e. incurs no negative cash flow at any probabilistic or temporal state and a positive cash 
flow in at least one state. (Pennacchi, 2008, p. 66) 
The particular form of arbitrage that will be covered in this thesis is commonly referred to as 
Risk Arbitrage (also referred to as Merger Arbitrage), and attempting to properly define it takes 
us back to definition 2. from the dictionary, i.e. “The purchase of the stock of a takeover target 
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especially with a view to selling it profitably to the raider.” While being a trivialisation of the 
practice, it captures the broad strokes of the strategy. In essence, risk arbitrage is the practice of 
assuming positions in the companies involved in a deal in such a way that the arbitrageur is 
exposed only to the deal completion risk, and not to the market risk. (Wyser-Pratte, 2009, p. 21) 
In this context, the deal may refer to a merger, LBO, MBO, or any other type of deal in which – 
at deal completion – the securities issued by the target company will be consummated. Let us 
take a simple example, that of a cash offer in which XYZ will acquire 100% of ABC‟s 
outstanding shares, the arbitrageur takes a long position in the shares of ABC and holds them 
until the deal is completed, at which point the shares are sold to XYZ. We may also consider the 
case of a stock merger where XYZ offers a number of XYZ shares for every share of ABC, here 
the arbitrageur takes a long position in the shares of ABC and a short position in XYZ shares 
such that the ratio between them is equal to the amount of XYZ shares offered for each ABC 
share. 
Both cases above does – in theory – only expose the arbitrageur to the very limited deal 
completion risk, by taking a position in the target when there is a formal offer made, the 
arbitrageur knows exactly which price the shares of the target company will fetch in a sale to the 
acquirer, provided the deal closes. The same is true for the second case, where the short position 
in the shares of the acquirer offset the long position the shares of the target, and ensures a 
locked-in profit, again provided the deal closes.  
The expression Risk Arbitrage may by now seem to be a contradiction in terms, as I have 
outlined the concept of arbitrage as that of locking in a risk-free profit, and while the risk 
arbitrageur does not assume market risk, he does assume deal completion risk. As I have no 
intention to confuse the reader, I will return to a more elaborate explanation of arbitrage and risk 
arbitrage in Chapter 3. 
1.1.2. Background Discussion 
As should be clear from the brief introduction to the concept of arbitrage in general and risk 
arbitrage in particular, risk arbitrage is to many fund managers and investors something of a holy 
grail. It is widely regarded as an almost mystical concept, the ability to generate abnormal 
returns out of thin air with little or no risk-taking. Although for some it paints the pictures of the 
spectacular implosions, such as that of Long-Term Capital Management in the late 1990s, a 
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majority of academic studies conducted during the 1990s and 2000s suggest that risk arbitrage is 
capable of generating substantial excess returns over time. (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001, p.2135)  
Given the secretive nature of the arbitrage community, and the doubled-edged nature of the 
practice of risk arbitrage, it comes as no surprise that there have been quite a few academic 
studies over the years, of which a detailed review can be found in section 3.5. The common 
denominator for these studies is that they are usually performed in the US stock market, arguably 
the world‟s largest and most efficient equity marketplace. Nevertheless, risk arbitrage as a 
strategy can be practiced in any equity market, so long as the market liquidity satisfies the 
appetite of the arbitrageur. Sweden, being the largest economy in Scandinavia, has a very 
developed equity market, with an average daily volume of   trades corresponding to a 
daily turnover of EUR  billion (SEK  billion). (NASDAQ OMX, 2011) This market 
should hence pose no hindrance to the adoption of a risk arbitrage strategy. Despite this, there 
has been a virtual absence of academic studies on the subject, which in my opinion makes it ever 
more interesting to investigate. 
1.3. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the ability of a risk arbitrage strategy to generate excess 
returns, alpha, in the Swedish stock market, evaluating the returns using both linear and non-
linear approaches. The purpose of the non-linear contingent claims evaluation is to capture any 
excess risk taking not captured by linear models, to the fullest extent possible 
1.4. LIMITATIONS 
The main involuntary limitation when attempting an empirical study of this nature is the 
availability of data. Each offer has to be examined, and even if one should read every newswire 
published for the period in the study, there is a risk of missing a deal. In addition to necessary 
data on the deal itself, there has to be data on the price and market value of the firms involved, 
otherwise computation of a portfolio would be impossible. Hence there is a practical limitation 
on both the scope and period available for study. As the M&A-database BvD Zephyr
1
 provides 
complete data on deals announced in the Swedish acquisition market back to the year 2000, this 
                                                 
1
 See section 2.3.1. for a detailed description of BvD Zephyr. 
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study will limit its scope to the period from January 2000 until December 2011, generating a 
portfolio for a total of 132 months, which should be adequate from a statistical perspective.  
All target companies in the study were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, now NASDAQ-
OMX Stockholm, at the time of deal announcement, a study including companies on alternative 
„venture‟ exchanges such as Nordic Growth Market and Aktietorget would be impractical given 
the scarce liquidity and generally low market capitalisation of companies listed there. These 
would most likely be excluded from the portfolio of any real-life arbitrageur and should hence be 
excluded from this study. Other than this, no limitation has been placed on liquidity, free-float or 
market value. 
Any deals whose method of payment differs from cash or stock have been excluded, as well as 
those containing complicated terms such as derivative portions or similar. There has been no 
exclusion on foreign buyers, provided their payment method fulfilled the stated criteria. The 
purpose of these self-imposed limitations is to ascertain the accuracy of the portfolio, given the 
inherent complexity in retrieving the data necessary and computing the returns of specialised 
derivative and debt instruments. 
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 2. METHOD 
This chapter contains a description of the approach, general method as well as a thorough description of 
the data. Attention will be given to both sample selection and the selection of variables. 
2.1. SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 
When writing a thesis, it is important to ascertain the most viable strategy and approach to the 
subject at hand. There are two main scientific approaches which are the most commonly used, 
namely the qualitative and the quantitative. The qualitative method focuses on theory and 
understanding rather than numerical data and hence it cannot reach any significant conclusions. 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 28) The quantitative method on the other hand puts emphasis on 
systematic data collection, and the mathematical processing of that data. As the aim of this thesis 
is to evaluate the performance of a risk arbitrage portfolio, which includes the application of 
mathematical financial methods on a dataset, a quantitative approach has been deemed the most 
appropriate for the task at hand. 
As the analysis undertaken constitutes the collection of empirical data from authentic and 
original sources, which is analysed using an already existing theoretical framework, a deductive 
approach would be the most fitting one. This as the deductive approach involves moving from 
theory to empiricism. (Bryman and Bell, 2007, pp. 11-15) According to Patel and Davidson 
(1991), a deductive approach is very common in academic theses, as it is common that the 
theoretical framework already exists. This is further reinforced by Bryman and Bell (2007, pp. 
11-15), who outlines the deductive approach as the most common view on the relationship 
between theory and research. 
2.2. GENERAL METHOD  
Initially, I undertook extensive literature studies on the subject of risk arbitrage. The purpose of 
the studies were to identify theoretical frameworks on which to base the thesis, as well as 
identifying the practical problems that might arise from implementing a risk arbitrage strategy. 
The bulk of the literature reviewed consists of scientific articles in journals, as well as books on 
subjects such as arbitrage, asset pricing and derivatives theory.  
After research on past literature had been completed, the data was gathered, using BvD Zephyr 
to obtain the necessary data on deals subject to my criteria. Deal data retrieved from BvD Zephyr 
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was then mated to ThomsonReuters Datastream Advance in order to obtain the time-series data 
necessary to compute a portfolio. Data on the market index and the risk-free rate were retrieved 
from ThomsonReuters and the Central Bank of Sweden respectively, and all data was fed to an 
Excel database.  
My portfolio, dubbed the MVWRA, Market Value Weighted Risk Arbitrage, was computed 
using the venerable MS Excel software. Linear econometric analysis was undertaken using the 
EViews, an econometrics package from Quantitative Micro Software. The more advanced 
nonlinear regression analysis was conducted using SegReg, which is a freely available 
econometrics package specifically designed for non-linear piecewise linear regression analysis. 
After regression analysis, the resulting final output has then been dissected and discussed using 
the theoretical framework described in Chapter 3. 
2.3. DATA METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1. Sample Selection 
The deliberate aim with this thesis is to include as many applicable deals as possible over the 
period from January 2000 to December 2011, i.e. over the course of 132 months.
2
 For every deal, 
it is necessary to collect a number of different datasets, making the process tedious.  
I based my deal data on the one available in Bureau van Dijk‟s Zephyr, a specialised M&A 
database claimed to be the world‟s most comprehensive database of deal information. (Bureau 
van Dijk, 2011) By taking a starting point in the data from Zephyr, I aimed to eliminate the risk 
of error that would be associated with manually searching 132 months of newswires. 
Furthermore, using a specialised deal database with well defined search criteria, it is very easy to 
align the sample with ones limitations by simply defining the criteria using a set of Boolean 
operators, a feature supported by Zephyr. This method of obtaining the data also had the distinct 
advantage of being much less time-consuming, giving me time to focus on the actual study at 
hand rather than the mechanical collection of data. A table describing the different data 
necessary to compute a portfolio can be found below in Table 2.1.  
                                                 
2
 Once again deal may refer to a merger, LBO, MBO, or any other type of deal in which – at deal completion – the 
securities issued by the target company will be consummated. 
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Table 2.1. Deal data 
Type Rationale for inclusion Source 
Deal announcement date 
Deal completion date 
Deal withdrawal date 
To know when to include the 
security of the target - and in stock 
deals also the acquirer - in the 
portfolio. 
BvD Zephyr  
Complemented by: 
Dagens Industri 
The Financial Times 
Price per share offered 
(alternatively the number of shares 
offered combined with the acquirer‟s 
share price) 
In order to compute the arbitrage 
spread and ascertain if the bid 
premium is positive, i.e. if a trade 
should be made. 
BvD Zephyr  
  
Method of payment In order to properly account for the 
different calculations necessary. 
BvD Zephyr  
 
Price, time series Necessary in order to compute the 
daily returns. 
ThomsonReuters Datastream  
 
Market Value, time series Necessary in order to compute the 
volume-weighted daily returns.  
ThomsonReuters Datastream  
 
 
After careful review of the Zephyr search results, Datastream was used to retrieve the necessary 
data. Out of 135 deals returned from Zephyr for the period lasting from January 2000 to 
December 2010, 111 matched all criteria set. Two were excluded on the basis of a negative bid 
premium, five contained complex deal terms, and for the remaining 17 there was a lack of time 
series data available in Datastream. The total sample contains 111 deals and the monthly returns 
span a total of 132 months, or 2611 trading days. 
2.3.2. The MVWRA 
The raw data mentioned in section 2.3.1. was used to construct a portfolio dubbed MVWRA, 
Market Value Weighted Risk Arbitrage. The portfolio contains all 111 deals, value weighted for 
when there were several parallel deals, and with the portfolio positioned in the risk-free rate for 
any period with an absence of ongoing deals.
3
 The portfolio does not include transaction costs, 
and neither does it adjust for price impact or liquidity issues, the purpose of this is to avoid 
extensive assumptions, while also making the study easy to replicate.  
                                                 
3
 The risk-free rate is derived from the SSVX90, the Swedish 90-day treasury bill, more information on this in 
section 2.3.4. 
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The MVWRA portfolio returns are computed on a daily basis and then compounded into 
monthly returns which are used in the study. Deals are included into the portfolio only on the day 
after they are announced and kept in the portfolio until the target stock is delisted, or the day 
after the deal failure is publicly announced. Use of the “day-after” approach is as to eliminate the 
possibility of inadvertently biasing the portfolio returns upward, as may otherwise be the case 
due to the wrongful inclusion of bid premiums. Furthermore, deals in which the terms are altered 
before consummation are considered multiple deals.  
The MVWRA portfolio contains 111 deals on 82 unique targets, of which 28 deals were 
withdrawn and 5 unresolved as of portfolio close, December 31
st
 2010, while the remaining 78 
deals were successful. Thus, on a unique target basis, the success rate for deals included in the 
portfolio was 95.12%.  In 94 deals cash was offered as payment while 17 deals were stock deals, 
also referred to as stock swaps.  
The return  on a cash deal  for a given day  is given in the following equation 
 
(2.1) 
where   denotes the price of the target company stock at market close and  denotes the 
stock price at market close t minus one day, this is how the daily return for the 94 cash deals was 
computed. For the remaining 17 stock deals the approach is slightly more complex as the 
portfolio has to assume a short position of  shares in the acquirer, where  is equal to the ratio 
of acquirer shares to target shares. The equation below gives the return for a stock deal 
 
(2.2) 
where  and  are the returns on the target and acquirer stock respectively,  denotes the risk-
free rate, and  and  are the t minus one closing prices of the target and acquirer stock 
respectively. In equation 2.2., the arbitrageur receives the kronor return  and has to pay 
the return in excess of the risk-free rate multiplied by his position in the acquirer, 
, the whole expression is the divided by the initial investment, in order to yield the 
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return on day . This is the same computational method, assuming no access to short sale 
proceeds for the arbitrageur, as used by Baker and Savasoglu (2002, p. 101) and hence, the up 
front investment required will be the same for both deal types, i.e. . 
When weighing the trades in the portfolio for parallel deals, there are two main methods, either 
equal weighting or value weighting. Equal weighting consists of weighting all open trades 
equally, regardless of the value of the deal, while value weighting takes into account the value of 
the deal at hand. While some studies such as Baker and Savasoglu (Ibid., p. 102) evaluate both 
for robustness, others such as (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001, p. 2147) use only the value weighted 
approach. Using an equal weighted portfolio is less complex, which is an argument for its usage. 
This argument is however void by the ease with which modern software can compute the 
weights of a portfolio, and given the market value weighted nature of my chosen reference index, 
the OMXS30, I have used the value weighted approach.
4
 
The portfolio return  for a day t can be seen in equation 2.3 below, where  denotes the 
weight of each individual deal in the portfolio, as given by weighing the deals by the market 
capitalisation of their respective target shares. 
 
(2.3) 
While equation 2.3. gives the daily return of the portfolio, this can be compounded into the 
monthly return as follows: 
 
(2.4) 
Equation 2.4. above yields the monthly return for the MVWRA portfolio, which is calculated for  
 to yield the 132 monthly MVWRA portfolio returns evaluated in this thesis. 
                                                 
4
 Elaborate information on the OMXS30 can be found in section 2.3.3. 
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2.3.3. Market Benchmark Index 
As this thesis aims to investigate the potential of a risk arbitrage strategy to generate a significant 
excess return, or alpha, the choice of benchmark index is an important one. For this thesis the 
OMX Stockholm 30, abbreviated OMXS30, was chosen as a benchmark index, and I intend to 
elaborate the rationale behind this. 
OMXS30 is the leading Swedish index, and it is designed specifically for liquidity and to be a 
suitable underlying index for derivative products. (NASDAQ OMX, 2011) This makes the 
OMXS30 very suitable, as this is a study which will use a Black-Sholes model that involves 
index put options. Hence, there is an inherent value in a benchmark index on which derivative 
products are actively traded. 
Furthermore, the index can claim a  correlation with the OMXS All-Share index since its 
inception, making it a good measure on the broader Swedish market. (NASDAQ OMX, 2011) 
In the words of NASDAQ-OMX, the exchange provider: 
“OMX Stockholm 30 is OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm's leading share 
index. The index consists of the 30 most actively traded stocks on the OMX 
Nordic Exchange Stockholm. The limited number of constituents guarantees 
that all the underlying shares of the index have excellent liquidity, which results 
in an index that is highly suitable as underlying for derivatives products. In 
addition OMXS30 is also used for structured products, e.g. warrants, index 
bonds, exchange traded funds such as XACT OMX™ and other non-
standardized derivatives products. The composition of the OMXS30 index is 
revised twice a year. The OMXS30 Index is a market weighted price index. The 
base date for the OMX Stockholm 30 Index is September 30, 1986, with a base 
value of 125.” (NASDAQ OMX, 2011) 
All necessary data for the OMXS30 index was computed using daily price data retrieved using 
the Thomson Reuters Datastream Advance software. 
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2.3.4. Risk-Free Rate 
The risk-free rate used in this study is that of the SSVX 90 (Statsskuldväxel, 90 dagar), which is 
the rate on the 90-day Treasury bill issued by the Swedish Central Bank, the Riksbank. 
The rationale behind using the 90-day maturity is the absence of credit risk, as well as the short 
maturity giving rise to virtually no liquidity or market risk. Furthermore, the use of Federal 
Reserve 90-day T-bills is the standard in studies on the U.S. market, for example those by 
Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) covered herein. Adding a 
practitioners perspective, the 90-day T-bill is a very common risk-free rate used by hedge funds 
when determining performance fees. 
All data for the SSVX 90 was retrieved directly from the Riksbank, using the online query 
system, freely available at their website. (Sveriges Riksbank, 2011)  
2.4. STATISTICAL METHODS 
This study will make use of the familiar and widely employed linear regression model (Ordinary 
Least Squares regression) in order to estimate the ability of the risk arbitrage portfolio to 
generate excess returns, this is given by equation 2.5 below. 
 
(2.5) 
As can be seen, the  part of equation 2.5. represents a general straight line equation, 
describing an exact linear relationship between  and , which evidently would be unrealistic. 
Thus, in OLS one adds the residual term  and then proceed to estimate the intercept, , and 
coefficient . These are estimated so that the sum of squared residuals  is minimised, 
hence the name Ordinary Least Squares regression. (Brooks, 2008, pp. 29-32) 
This method, while simple and crude, is extremely powerful within the context of the linear 
Sharpe-Lintner-Black Capital Asset Pricing Model, which I will return to in Chapter 3. 
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As it can be argued that risk-arbitrage does not have a linear relationship with the market, I will 
also utilise a non-linear regression model in order to capture this relationship, should it exist.
5
 It 
is possible to estimate what is referred to as a non-linear piecewise linear regression model. This 
is a model which is overall non-linear, albeit consisting of linear segments or “pieces”. The 
piecewise regression model is a sub-technique within the spline technique area. (Brooks, 2008, p. 
462) If  varies with  so that their relationship differs should  assume a value larger or 
smaller than a threshold value, , then their relationship can be described by a piecewise linear 
model, expressed as  
 
(2.6) 
Equation 2.6. above includes a dummy variable,  which assumes the value one if  and 
zero otherwise. The evident problem from this is that it requires our threshold,  to be known, 
which it is not. To ensure consistency with the OLS-methodology, I will use the value of that 
minimises the sum of squared residuals, . 6  An introduction to piecewise regression 
models can be found in Brooks (2008, pp. 462-465) 
While there are other models that will describe non-linear relationships, the nature of the 
piecewise linear model ensures compatibility with CAPM as well as non-linear frameworks, 
while also enabling a simple and elegant model to describe seemingly complex relationships.  
  
                                                 
5
 Non-linearity is argued by several studies and present in a wide array of literature, including Branch and Yang 
(2005), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Kirchner (2009), Wyser-Pratte (2009). This topic is discussed in-depth in 
Chapter 3.  
6
 An elaborative description on this course of action can be found in section 3.3. 
Page | 17  
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter I will elaborate on the theoretical framework on which this study is built. The Black-
Scholes model, CAPM as well as general theory on Arbitrage will be discussed. I will also present a 
number of previous studies on the subject, which will aid the analysis in Chapter 4. 
3.1. RISK ARBITRAGE  
3.1.1. Defining Risk Arbitrage 
Continuing where I left the topic in my introduction, let us consider the definition of arbitrage as 
a self financing trading strategy generating a positive return without risk, i.e. the portfolio incurs 
no negative cash flow at any probabilistic or temporal state and a positive cash flow in at least 
one state. (Pennacchi, 2008, p. 66)  
The assumption of arbitrage-free prices in academia can be made because of the presence of 
arbitrageurs in the marketplace. (Hull, 2008, pp. 14-15) Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies, 
for example by selling into the expensive market and buying into the cheap market, in doing so 
they force they prices to converge into an equilibrium price. It goes without argument that this 
makes markets more efficient, as there will be only one price for the asset or derivative, and 
hence other market participants are spared potential costs of information, overpaying and 
underselling. (Kirchner, 2009, p. 4) This has never been truer than today, in the second 
millennia, where the speed and ferocity with which arbitrageurs at hedge-funds and dealing 
desks strike down on price discrepancies is second to none. 
The academic definition outlined above serves as “the primary technique with which to value one 
asset in terms of another”. (Pennacchi, 2008, p.58) Being a prerequisite for general market 
equilibrium, the assumption of no-arbitrage is indeed a cornerstone in pricing frameworks such 
as the Black-Scholes (Black and Scholes, 1976, p. 637) and the Sharpe-Lintner-Black Capital 
Asset Pricing Model. (Black, 1972, p. 444; Sharpe, 1964, p. 436) 
The definition above, that is the strict academic definition, does however differ from the 
definition as used generally in practice by traders. Not unexpectedly, arbitrageurs and traders 
have a less strict definition of arbitrage than does the academic scholar. The practitioners instead 
prefer the notion of arbitrage as a strategy with a positive expected value taking advantage of two 
securities being mispriced relative to each other. (Hull, 2008. p. 773) This strategy is most 
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commonly self-financing, but need not be. (Taleb, 1997, p. 80) As pointed out by Taleb (Ibid.), 
issues such as risk-neutrality and Martingale are at best irrelevant to most traders.   
Table 3.1. below tranches the above “traders‟ definition” of arbitrage into three different orders, 
where only the first order can be said to be closely linked to the stricter, academic definition of 
arbitrage. 
Table 3.1. Orders of arbitrage 
Degree of Arbitrage Definition Practical Implementation 
First order A strong, locked-in mechanical 
relationship, same instrument 
Cash-and-carry arbitrage 
Triangular arbitrage 
Location arbitrage 
Euro-option conversion arbitrage 
Second order Different instruments, same 
underlying security 
Cash-future arbitrage 
Program trading arbitrage 
Delivery arbitrage 
Option spread trading 
Second order Different - albeit related - underlying 
securities, same instrument 
Bond arbitrage 
Forward trading 
Volatility trading 
Third order Different securities, different 
instruments, deemed to behave in 
correlated/related manner 
Asset spread trading 
Rates correlation trading 
Cross-currency yield curve arbitrage 
Source: Nassim Taleb, Dynamic Hedging : Managing Vanilla and Exotic Options (1997, p. 81) Reproduced under 
the provisions laid forth in Section 108 of the United States Copyright Act. 
 
As evident from Table 3.1. there is a wide range of practical implementations of arbitrage, of 
which those classified as second and third order are the most common. The second and third 
order strategies are also strategies where the arbitrageur assumes some sort of risk, the common 
denominator being that the arbitrageur avoids market risk, while still assuming a different form 
of risk. These quasi-arbitrage strategies are referred to by a number of names such as statistical 
arbitrage, or in our case risk arbitrage, which could be classified as second or third order 
arbitrage as per Table 3.1. (Kirchner, 2009, p. 5)  
The risk assumed could theoretically be any kind of risk different from market risk, and in our 
case it will be the so-called deal completion risk. i.e. the risk that the deal is not completed due to 
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financial, legal, regulatory or other issues. It should also be noted that the author of Table 3.1., 
Dr. Taleb, does not consider risk arbitrage a form of arbitrage. Taleb (1997, p. 80) does however 
say about arbitrage in general that “arbitrageurs believe in capturing mispricings between 
instruments or markets”; which is exactly what the risk arbitrageur aims to achieve. That is, he 
(the arbitrageur) aims to capture the relative mispricing between the price offered, be it in stock 
or cash, and the price at which the target is trading.  
Defining risk arbitrage as a quasi-arbitrage strategy, I would like to make a point analogous to 
that made by Kirchner (2009). That is, the recognition of arbitrage as its own practice, different 
from the practice of speculation. While the speculator assumes a position with the hope of 
making a profitable exit from said position, he does not know at which price he is able to execute 
the exit. The speculator may have a very well-defined strategy, but in the end he is open to 
uncertainty. This is in contrast to the arbitrageur who (in theory) knows at which price he buys, 
and at which price he sells. 
In the case of the risk arbitrageur this is true in that the price offered is known, and the 
arbitrageur captures the spread between the known trading price of the target security and the 
known price offered by the acquirer. There is however a probability strictly greater than zero that 
the deal fails, the deal completion risk, and hence the word “risk” in risk arbitrage.  
3.1.2. Characteristics of Risk Arbitrage 
There is also a further caveat adjoined to the notion of arbitrage as a practice different from 
speculation, and that is the nature of the relationships one aims to arbitrage. While the very rare 
first order arbitrage opportunities offers a bet on an a priori known, mechanical relationships, the 
risk arbitrageur bets on the a posteriori knowledge that a significant part of  deals are 
successfully consummated
7
, yielding the arbitrageur a positive expected return.
8
 
The risk arbitrageur then places a bet on behavioral stability, rather than mechanical, the former 
being inherently more risky than the latter, representing a weaker order of arbitrage. It could in 
fact be argued that where historical records suggest a behaviorally stable relationship, there are 
“booby traps” which could cause the arbitrage strategy to implode. (Taleb, 1997, p. 81) 
                                                 
7
 My data records a 95.12% success rate, while that of  Baker and Savasoglu records one of 86%, Jindra and 
Walking records 96.7% and Schwert one of 94%. Other studies show similar results. 
8
 See table 3.2. below. 
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This would be consistent with the note by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001, p. 2135) that risk 
arbitrage has played a significant role in some very spectacular implosions, such as that of 
LTCM.
9
 And we are yet to see the last scholar or trader to label the practice of risk arbitrage “an 
act of picking up pennies if front of a steamroller”10  Despite these claims to the contrary, 
academic research into the ability of a risk arbitrage strategy to generate excess returns have 
returned very promising results, of which some are presented in Table 3.2 below.
11
 The 
seemingly contradictory observations of large excess returns and “booby trap” or implosion-
proneness are implying that the strategy is exhibiting non-linearity of returns. 
Table 3.2. Excess Return in Academic Studies  
Study Annualised excess return  Note 
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) 12.5 % Event study 
Branch and Yang (2005) 22.42 %  
Dukes et al. (1992) > 100% Event study 
Jindra and Walkling (2001) 26,97% Event study 
Karolyi and Shannon (1998) 25 %  
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) 9.9 %  
 
An early study of the non-linear characteristics of risk arbitrage is that by Bhagat et.al (1987, pp. 
975-976), where the conclusion is that linear asset pricing models such as CAPM fail to properly 
address the non-linearity of risk arbitrage. Mitchell and Pulvino‟s widely quoted study of 4750 
mergers between 1963 to 1998 conclude that risk arbitrage is akin to writing uncovered index put 
options, generating an essentially zero beta in appreciating markets, and a non-zero, positive beta 
in depreciating markets. (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001, p. 2137) This is further reinforced by 
Branch and Yang (2005, p. 55) who reach the same conclusion about non-linearity in cash deals. 
The same observation is made by Agarwal and Naik (2004, p. 66), referring to it as significant 
left-tail risk, or left-skewed non-linearity. On a more general basis, it is found by Merton (1981, 
p. 365) as well as Dybvig and Ross (1985, p. 397) in the course of their respective evaluation(s) 
                                                 
9
 Long-Term Capital Management, arbitrage hedge fund founded by arbitrageur John W. Meriwether, with Myron 
Scholes and Robert C. Merton, quoted herein, serving as directors.  
10
 This has in fact been used by several people, including by not limited to, Roger Lowenstein, Laurie Pinto and 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the latter is most often credited with coining the phrase. 
11
 A more in-depth review of some of the studies is presented in section 3.4. 
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of linear asset pricing models, that option-like non-linearities are present in portfolios managed 
with superior information.
12
 They further conclude that the CAPM and other linear asset pricing 
models are generally insufficient in evaluating said portfolios due to their linear nature, 
something I shall return to later in this chapter.  
The notion of non-linearity also makes sense from a practitioners view when considering two 
things, firstly the AVP, or asymmetric volatility phenomenon, and secondly, the use of leverage 
and lack of diversification with arbitrage hedge fund managers. Volatility feedback at the market 
level, exclusive of the firm leverage, is argued by Bekaert and Wu (2000, pp. 6-8) and forms the 
basis of the AVP. Given the widely observed tendency for markets to slowly gain ground only to 
crash rather spectacularly, this notion does not seem far-fetched. When this is coupled with the 
use of highly leveraged and/or non-diversified portfolios, as would likely be the case with risk 
arbitrage considering the rather small spread (median spread for successful deals with the 
MVWRA at  was ) and the high expected success rate (MVWRA unique target 
success rate ), it produces a rather lethal cocktail, or “booby trap”13 While the MVWRA 
portfolio does not simulate leverage, it does simulate the absence of diversification by being 
willing to commit the whole portfolio to a few, or even a single, open deal(s).  
To put it bluntly, it could be implied that picking up the pennies in front of the steamroller will 
generate alpha until a point in time, at which a shock sufficient enough to generate significant 
volatility is introduced to the system, at this point the steamroller runs over the arbitrageur.  
Nevertheless, over time, the expected excess return of risk arbitrage is consistently positive 
according to all studies I have researched. 
3.1.2. Explanations for Excess Returns in Risk Arbitrage 
From the significant excess returns reported by the studies outlined in Table 3.2., there is 
considerable evidence that the market is inefficient in pricing stocks involved in deals. The risk 
arbitrageur then simply acts as an arbitrageur in the classic sense of the word, and captures the 
pricing inefficiency. While this notion could be argued to partly explain risk arbitrage returns, 
                                                 
12
 The fact that arbitrageurs typically resides with superior information is convincingly put forth by among others 
Shleifer and Vishnvy, 1997. 
13
 This lethal cocktail (or “booby trap”) being what Taleb (1997, p 81) refers to in his notion about implosion-
proneness in quasi-arbitrage. 
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and likely is partly responsible, I argued in section 3.1.1. that pricing inefficiencies of this 
magnitude should, theoretically, not exist. 
Enter the insurance explanation, as argued by Baker and Savasoglu (2000). The basic idea is that 
the arbitrageur acts as a de facto insurance provider to the marketplace, accepting the deal 
completion risk that other investors are unwilling to bear. In theory, the markets should 
immediately after announcement reflect the deal price. In reality, there could be a very large 
free-float held by a wide array of investors, most rather unwilling to assume the deal completion 
risk with a limited upside and unknown downside. This is coupled with a rather limited number 
of investors – the arbitrageurs – willing to buy these quantities of a stock with said limitations on 
returns. The result is a scenario of excess supply, arbitrageurs being virtually the only buyers in 
the market, which produces a selling pressure and dislocates the target share price from the 
actual deal price, hence producing a spread which can be arbitraged. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
pp. 36-37)  By acting as an insurer in the marketplace the arbitrageur earns a known premium for 
assuming essentially unknown downside risk, another argument for risk arbitrage being 
analogous to writing uncovered put options. 
3.2. THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL  
Despite their almost unanimous critique of the accuracy of the Sharp-Linter-Black Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (henceforth referred to as the CAPM) in evaluating risk arbitrage returns, the 
studies mentioned in section 3.1. have one thing in common, they all use the CAPM or one of its 
derivatives. 
CAPM is the number one asset pricing model, as eloquently put by Fama and French (2004, p. 
25) “Although every asset pricing model is a capital asset pricing model, the finance profession 
reserves the acronym CAPM for the specific model of Sharpe(1964), Linter (1965) and Black 
(1972)...” The model is so widely used, that even when attempting to correctly account for non-
linearity, scholars use a linear CAPM in some respect, as will I. While it is not purposeful for 
this study to derive or fully elaborate the vast topic of the CAPM, a high-level overview is 
necessary in order to showcase its genius and its shortcomings. 
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As mentioned in section 3.1.1. the CAPM is an equilibrium pricing model, assuming general 
equilibrium as well as a few assumptions about investors and the opportunity set, these 
assumptions are as follows:
14
 
a) Investors are risk averse individuals who maximise the expected utility of their wealth. 
b) Investors are mean-variance optimisers. 
c) Investors have homogenous expectations about asset returns. 
d) The quantities of assets are fixed and all assets are marketable and infinitely divisible. 
e) Perfect capital markets i.e. 
i. Investors are price-takers. 
ii. No taxes. 
iii. No transaction costs. 
iv. There is a risk-free asset and investors may lend of borrow unlimited 
amounts at the risk free rate. 
Provided that general equilibrium as well as the above assumptions hold, the expected return on 
an asset,  can be expressed as follows: 
 
(3.1) 
In equation 3.1. above,  denotes the risk-free rate,   the expected market return and  
the covariance between the market and the asset, while  is the market standard deviation of 
returns. Note that  divided by  is equal to the beta-coefficient, . Equation 3.1. is also 
referred to as the Security Market Line (SML), and perhaps the most important property of the 
CAPM is that in equilibrium all assets are priced so that their respective (risk-adjusted) rates of 
return fall exactly on the SML. A further implication is that investors will pay premium only to 
avoid covariance risk. (Copeland et al., 2005, p. 152) 
Equation 3.1. represents an ex ante  form of the CAPM, and while elegant, for the task at hand, 
that is the evaluation of portfolio returns, it serves no purpose. CAPM does however lend itself to 
an equally elegant transformation from a representation of expectations ex ante to observations 
                                                 
14
 Assumptions as listed in Copeland et al., (2005, pp. 147-148), see also Sharpe (1964, pp. 430-434) 
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ex post. In making this transformation, it is assumed that capital markets represent a fair game, 
expressed in equation 3.2. below.
15
 (Ibid., p. 165) That is, equation 3.2. represents the “market 
model” as presented by Jensen (1968, p. 391), who showed that  is approximately equal to the 
beta coefficient, .   is a “market factor” equal to  and  a random error 
term. (Ibid., p. 392) 
 
(3.2) 
In equation 3.2. the following holds:  ,  ,  ,  
and . (Ibid., p. 392) Substitution of   from equation 3.1. into equation 3.2. yields 
the following equation: 
 
(3.3) 
Equation 3.3. represents CAPM ex post and its usefulness is evident for anyone familiar with 
linear regression. By allowing for a non-zero intercept, , in equation 3.3., we have the actual 
equation which will be used in conjunction with linear regression in order to estimate excess 
returns, equation 3.4. 
 
(3.4) 
Equation 3.4 is commonly referred to as the Single-Index Model or the Security Characteristic 
Line. In the original CAPM context, the intercept term should not be significantly different 
from zero for any asset, . It is however argued by Jensen (1967) that allowing for a non-zero 
intercept in equation 3.3. will allow this intercept to represent the “the average incremental rate 
of return of the portfolio per unit time which is due solely to the manager‟s ability to forecast 
future security prices” (Ibid., p. 394) This interpretation of the non-zero intercept, or alpha, has 
become the world standard in portfolio manager evaluation, and will be used in this thesis to 
measure the excess return of the MVWRA portfolio.      
                                                 
15
 For a thorough explanation of CAPM as a fair game, see Copeland et al. Chapter 10, pp. 370-372 in particular.  
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3.3. PRICING NON-LINEARITY IN RISK ARBITRAGE 
As mentioned in section 3.1, a wide array of academic studies have found hedge funds in general 
and risk arbitrage in particular to exhibit a non-linear, option-like relationship to market returns, 
i.e. similarities to writing uncovered index put options. This presents a peculiar problem as our 
widely used model, the CAPM, is linear in nature and would thus unable to properly account for 
such non-linearities, as shown by several studies presented in section 3.1.  
There is however remedy for this problem in the form of a method shown by Glosten and 
Jagannathan (1994), built on Merton‟s (1981) and Merton and Henriksson‟s (1981) research on 
fund managers and market timing. The paper by Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) is very general 
in nature and shows that, using a contingent claims approach, one can more accurately 
approximate the performance of active managers than with linear approaches. Glosten and 
Jagannathan (1994) show that the value of performance is the equivalent to valuing a specific 
contingent claim on an index, i.e. by constructing a replicating portfolio using options on an 
index, and comparing this to an investment in the portfolio being evaluated, one can value the 
performance of the portfolio. The contingent claim can be valued using any options-pricing 
model, and I will make us of the widely used Black-Scholes model, which is covered in section 
3.4. 
The form of the payoff (return) projection is not given in the general method and must hence be 
estimated, it is however suggested to use a “one-knot spline”, an approach similar to the one 
suggested by Henriksson and Merton (1981). (Glosten and Jagannathan, 1994, p. 145, p. 158) 
The most significant difference here is that while the Henriksson-Merton-approach suggests 
placing the knot spline exactly at the risk-free return (rate), Glosten and Jagannathan (1994, p. 
143, p. 148) suggest choosing the knot spline placement, or threshold, based on minimisation of 
the sum of squared errors (residuals).  
The basic concept is to utilise a linear model, such as CAPM, in conjunction with a linear 
estimation method, such as linear OLS regression, albeit with a threshold point (the one-knot 
spline) which will generate an overall non-linear function. Agarwal and Naik (2004, p. 64) 
suggest specifying a non-linear piecewise linear regression model, which is an approach used by 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001, p. 2142). Now recall equations 2.6., my piecewise linear regression 
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model, and 3.4., the CAPM ex-post. Combining them to estimate a piecewise linear CAPM-
derived model yields the following equation to be estimated for a portfolio  
 
(3.5) 
Equation 3.5 makes use of one alpha for appreciating markets, , and one for depreciating 
markets  while the same is applied to beta,  and  respectively. Appreciating 
markets are those where  and depreciating markets are where 
 , similarly,  is a dummy variable whose value is one for 
 and zero if     denotes the treshold level, or 
knot spline, as denoted by  in equation 2.6. 
In keeping with Glosten and Jagannathan‟s (1994, p. 143, p. 158) method the model is composed 
as portfolio return as a function of a market return, as well as a residual term, , with an expected 
value of zero, . This is, as evident from sections 2.4. and 3.2., perfectly in line with the 
assumptions of both the CAPM and the OLS regression model. Equation 3.5 is also estimated 
subject to a continuity-ensuring restriction, as used by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001, p.2142) 
 to ensure that the estimation 
yields a continuous non-linear piecewise linear function. This estimation is necessary to keep the 
piecewise linear regression estimation in line with Glosten and Jagannathan‟s (1994) method, 
advocating a spline on a non-linear piecewise linear, continuous line.  
While equation 3.5. will yield information about the characteristics of the series, it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to evaluate the characteristics of risk arbitrage in the Swedish market, but 
rather to evaluate its ability to generate alpha in both linear and non-linear models. In order to 
generate a meaningful, non-linearity-adjusted alpha from equation 3.5., an option-pricing 
framework has to be put to use, I intend to utilise the Black-Scholes model, as presented below 
in section 3.4.  
In evaluating excess returns, I will assume that risk arbitrage is akin to writing uncovered index 
put options, as there is significant academic research pointing towards this, research which is 
further underlined by observations of scholars and fund managers as presented in sections 3.1. 
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and 3.5. Hence, a risk arbitrage portfolio could be replicated by writing (issuing, shorting) 
uncovered index put options and purchasing a risk-free bond. 
To replicate the one-month return on an investment in risk arbitrage, I construct a replicating 
portfolio by acquiring a bond with face value ) and write  
number of put options with strike ). The value of this 
portfolio,   equals: 
 
(3.6) 
where  denotes present value,  denotes the Black-Scholes price of a put 
option with strike,  as above, underlying value,  , risk-free rate,  equal to the 
actual sample average, standard deviation of returns,  also equal to the sample average, and 
time until expiry,  of  one month. The value of this portfolio, , is subsequently 
compared to the value of the investment in risk arbitrage  and should then 
risk arbitrage generates a monthly excess return, alpha, equal to  
The above constitutes a generalisation of the approach presented by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001, 
pp. 2161-2164), built on the framework by Glosten and Jagannathan (1994), Merton (1981) and 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) as presented herein. 
3.4. THE BLACK-SCHOLES MODEL 
In order to properly account the non-linearity in risk arbitrage using Glosten and Jagannathan‟s 
(1994) framework, I will value a portfolio consisting of a bond and a contingent claim. While the 
contingent claim, or option, can theoretically be valued using any option pricing model, I will 
employ the Black-Scholes model (sometimes referred to as the Black-Scholes-Merton model).  
Originally conceived in the early 1970s, the model and its spin-offs has become the standard in 
option pricing in academia as well as with practitioners. (Hull, 2008, p. 277) Despite the 
numerous, rather ambitious attempts to dethrone the Black-Scholes model with improved 
models, almost all of these models have died trying. “No experienced trader would willingly 
trade Black-Scholes-Merton for another pricing tool.” (Taleb, 1997, p. 109)   
Page | 28  
 
As with the CAPM, I will refrain from a full derivation as it would not serve any purpose for the 
thesis, and I will briefly outline the assumptions and basic mechanics of the model. Black and 
Scholes (1973) present a few assumptions under which the model is derived. These are referred 
to as the “ideal conditions”. (Ibid., p. 640):  
a) The short-term interest rate is known and remains constant as time passes. 
b) The stock price follows a random walk in continuous time, having a variance rate 
proportional to the square of the stock price.
16
 The variance rate of return is constant. 
c) The stock pays no dividends or other coupons. 
d) The option can only be exercised at maturity. (it is European) 
e) There are no transaction costs. 
f) It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security to buy or hold it at the short-
term interest rate.  
g) There are no penalties for short selling, i.e. the short sale is the exact opposite of a buy 
and the short seller is not penalised by fees. 
The above assumptions are shown by Merton (1973, p. 160) as being equivalent to: 
1) The standard form of the CAPM holds for intertemporal trading, and that trading takes 
place in continuous time. 
2) The short-term interest rate remains constant as time passes. 
3) There are no dividends or exercise price changes during the life of the contract. 
Thus, the Black-Scholes model invokes the very same assumptions as the CAPM, with the 
addition of two. Under the presence of these assumptions, Black and Scholes (1973 p. 641) 
showed that: “it is possible to create a hedged position consisting of only a long position in the 
stock and a short position in the option, whose value will not depend on the price of the stock.” 
The basic concept behind their derivation is that of perfect hedging. That is, the “position” or 
portfolio above is adjusted as the stock price changes, by the selling of further options, or 
repurchase of already sold ones, this in order to maintain the perfect hedge. Provided this hedge 
is maintained continuously the return on the position becomes certain, and equal to the risk-free 
                                                 
16
 This makes the distribution of the stock price, at the end of a finite interval, lognormal. See Hull (2008, p. 277-
280) for an elaboration on lognormal distributions within the context of option pricing. 
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rate of return. (Merton, 1973, p. 160) Then, the price of a European call option can be derived 
using stochastic calculus to reach the Black-Scholes option pricing formula:
17
  
 
(3.7) 
Where  and ,  denotes the stock price,  represents 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution,  the exercise price,  
is the risk-free rate,  is the standard deviation (volatility) of returns, and  denotes time to 
maturity. 
By using put-call parity, i.e. the notion that , it is possible to show that 
the price of a European put option will be given by the following formula: 
 
(3.8) 
Equation 3.8. above, yielding the Black-Scholes price of a European put option, is the pricing 
formula which will be used in this thesis in order to assign a value, , to the replicating 
portfolio from section 3.3.  
While extensive in assumptions, the Black-Scholes formula is a very attractive as all of its 
variables are clearly observable, and that it is independent of the expected return on the 
underlying stock. (Ibid., p. 160)
18
 Furthermore, while it is known from empirical tests that prices 
paid by option buyers are systematically higher than the prices given by the formula, Black and 
Scholes (1973, p. 653) have shown through empirical test that the prices received by writers of 
options are approximately equal to the equivalent Black-Scholes price. This is a favourable 
observation for the evaluation undertaken in this thesis, as the valuation of  involves the 
theoretical writing of a put option. 
                                                 
17
 See Black-Scholes (1973, pp. 642-644) for the full, formal derivation. 
18
 Let it be noted that the volatility, unlike the risk-free rate, the time to maturity, the stock price and the exercise 
price, cannot be directly observed, but rather has to be estimated from historical stock price data. 
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Mitchell and Pulvino (2001, p. 2164) tested the validity of their contingent claims approach 
using Black-Scholes, by also assigning a value,  to their replicating portfolio using actual put 
prices. It was found that the use of Black-Scholes only slightly overestimated the alpha, when 
compared to actual put option prices, and that this stemmed from the difference between actual 
and implied volatilites. This slight difference was found to have no significant implications on 
their result or conclusions. (Ibid., p. 2164) Thus, there is no empirical evidence against using the 
Black-Scholes formula to price the contingent claim in the replicating portfolio.  
3.5. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF RISK ARBITRAGE  RETURNS   
Although sections 3.1 and 3.3. contains an glimpse of some previous studies of risk arbitrage 
returns by default, I will herein attempt to summarise previous findings with the intention that 
this will aid the reader in interpreting my results as well as putting my conclusions into context. 
The studies are presented in alphabetical order by author surname, and emphasis is put on studies 
aiming to evaluate the ability of risk arbitrage to generate excess returns. 
3.5.1. Baker and Savasoglu (2001) 
Title: Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions. The authors aim to evaluate risk arbitrage 
returns, in doing so they also aim to evaluate the origin of the excess returns generated by risk 
arbitrage strategies. It is shown, that for the period from 1981 to 1996, risk arbitrage produces an 
excess return of  per month. The dataset used is one of 4135 announced deals 
retrieved from the CSRP database. Rather than constructing a calendar time portfolio, such as my 
MVWRA, Baker and Savasoglu (2001) calculate the returns for the first 30 days after deal 
announcement. While this has the benefit that it eliminates benchmarking over longer horizons, 
which can be challenging, it also has the disadvantage that it is very unlikely that these event-
time returns would be sustainable. Nevertheless, Baker and Savasoglu (2001, p. 112) reach some 
interesting conclusions not only regarding the excess returns, but also regarding the 
characteristics of said returns. They find that the average, often undiversified investor, is keen to 
sell stock holdings to arbitrageurs to avoid completion risk. The limited capital of arbitrageurs 
ensure that investors will have to sell at a discount, essentially earning the arbitrageur a premium 
for insuring deal completion risk. This point is convincingly argued and parallels are made to 
empirical studies of the insurance market.    
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3.5.2. Branch and Yang (2005) 
Title: A Test of Risk Arbitrage Profitability. The title says it all, a thorough test of the 
profitability of risk arbitrage and its ability to generate excess returns. Using a sample of mergers 
between 1990 and 2000 for a total of 1309 U.S. deals, it is found that risk arbitrage generates a 
significant monthly alpha of  (  annualised) 
The sample does not exhibit the same option-like characteristics as argued by other studies, 
rather than producing a significant and higher beta in down markets, it produces a negative beta 
in said markets. It is however found that this is due to the high percentage ( ) of stock offers 
in the sample, implying that sample bias may influence whether a sample exhibits option-like 
non-linearities.
19
 This is logical from the fact that stock offers are hedged by shorting the 
acquirer stock, thus ensuring some degree of hedge against negative market returns. 
3.5.3. Jindra and Walkling (2001) 
Title: Speculation Spreads and the Market Pricing of Proposed Acquisitions. Jindra and 
Walkling‟s (2001) working paper has the primary aim to study the behaviour of post-
announcement spreads, i.e. the differences between the market price of the target stock and the 
actual price offered by the acquirer. The sample used is a total of 362 cash deals spanning the 
1981-1995 period. The average annualised excess return found from investing in their sample is 
 for the event study, however this drops to  using a Fama-French three-factor model 
on monthly portfolio returns. Additionally, the paper finds that spreads in mergers and 
acquisition deals are significantly related to bid premiums, pre-offer run-up of the stock price, 
managerial attitude to the offer, as well as the presence of rumours. The findings about arbitrage 
spreads and their determinants – while interesting – does not represent findings of significane for 
this study, and hence the interested reader is referred to the paper itself.  
3.5.4. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) 
Title: Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage. Mitchell and Pulvino‟s (2001) paper 
was one of the main inspirations for myself when researching this thesis, it has also turned out to 
be the most widely quoted of the studies presented here in section 3.5. Using a sample of 4750 
deals in the years from 1963 and 1998, by far the most comprehensive in both calendar-time and 
                                                 
19
 When evaluating the cash offers separately, they are found to exhibit the same kind of non-linearities as shown by 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). 
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number of deals, it is found that risk arbitrage generates a significant monthly alpha of  
(  annualised) using a linear approach, and  (  annualised) using a contingent 
claims approach based on the findings by Glosten and Jagannathan (1994).
20
 The approach used 
is a calendar-time portfolio approach with monthly returns, similar to that used by myself and 
Baker and Savasoglu (2001).  
The characteristics of risk arbitrage are evaluated using the CAPM, the Fama and French three-
factor model as well as a non-linear contingent claims model, using Black-Scholes. Regressions 
are also done on a sub-sample basis to ensure robustness, and their RAIM (Risk Arbitrage Index 
Manager) portfolio is designed so that transaction costs, including the cost of entering a 
(relatively) illiquid stock, are accounted for to the extent possible under some assumptions. 
These rather ambitious attempts to “cover it all”, sets the paper apart from other previous studies 
as well as this thesis. In addition to the excess return figures produced, the single most significant 
finding is that risk arbitrage is found to exhibit significant option-like non-linearities, and it is 
concluded that practicing risk arbitrage is akin to writing uncovered index put options. (Mitchell 
and Pulvino, 2001, p. 2137, 2171) While other studies touch the subject of option-like non-
linearities and also show that risk arbitrage does exhibit them, the large nature of the sample and 
the approach using a monthly return series does lend this study some quite unparallel academic 
credibility. 
It should be duly noted that the resulting excess returns are lower than in most other studies, 
which could imply that the efforts to fully capture the characteristics of risk arbitrage may have 
resulted in return figures that are in fact too low. However, given the encompassing nature of the 
sample, and the rather spectacular results produced by some other studies, it is my personal 
opinion that Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) have produced the most accurate and rigorous study of 
risk arbitrage returns to date.  
 
 
  
                                                 
20
 As stated in section 3.3., my approach is analogous to the one used by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), the difference 
being that I present it in a more general manner for ease of replication. 
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Herein the data output is presented together with descriptive statistics in section 4.1. In section 4.2. I aim 
to discuss the output of the regression analysis using the theories and research presented in Chapter 3. 
4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DATA 
The MVWRA portfolio constructed using the assumptions and methods in section 2.3. contains a 
total of 132 monthly returns, covering 2611 trading days, a full summary of the monthly returns 
is located in Appendix I.  In Table 4.1. below you will find a brief summary of the yearly returns, 
yearly standard deviations and yearly Sharpe ratios. 
Table 4.1. MVWRA yearly data 
Year Return Std. Dev Sharpe Ratio 
2000 9,49% 3,54% 2,68 
2001 12,78% 8,35% 1,53 
2002 7,72% 6,68% 1,16 
2003 16,81% 14,58% 1,15 
2004 28,54% 13,94% 2,05 
2005 21,24% 17,32% 1,23 
2006 17,51% 16,19% 1,08 
2007 3,72% 20,50% 0,18 
2008 -4,42% 8,18% -0,54 
2009 66,73% 36,68% 1,82 
2010 15,74% 19,12% 0,82 
 
Investing in the MVWRA over the total 132-month period would have yielded a return of 
 (   annualised) while an investment in the OMXS30 index would have yielded 
 and an investment in the SSVX90 risk-free rate, reinvested on a monthly basis, would 
have returned , the series are plotted in Figure 4.1. The average yearly standard deviation 
of returns for the MVWRA portfolio was equal to  for the full 11-year period. (OMXS30 
averaged a yearly standard deviation of ), while the sample average annual risk-free rate 
(SSVX90) was .
21
 
The MVWRA returns are not deemed to be extraordinary within the context of risk arbitrage (see 
sections 3.1. and 3.5.), and are in fact lower than even the excess returns of four out of six studies 
in Table 3.2. This despite the fact that the only year with negative performance was 2008, when 
the MVWRA suffered a loss of  while the market index lost . Sharpe ratios are 
                                                 
21
 Volatility per annum given by: daily volatility multiplied by the square root of 252, the number of trading days. 
Method as described by Hull (2008, p. 284) 
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calculated for reference, being a popular measure among hedge funds, on a yearly basis, and 
could be deemed satisfactory for all years, less 2007 and 2008, where they are exceptionally low. 
The average monthly return for the MVWRA portfolio was , the three best months were 
July 2009 ( ), December 2009 ( ) and March 2010 ( ), while the worst 
were September 2003 ( ) February 2007 ( ) and February 2010 ( ).  
In terms of deals, as stated in section 2.3.1., there were  deals included covering  unique 
target companies, of which  acquisitions were successful. This implies that there were  offer 
amendments or competing bids launched, which are most likely responsible for the more extreme 
monthly returns, such as the three shown above. The unique target success rate of  is in-
line with those of previous studies, where success rates in the high nineties are common.  
 
 
It can also be observed that the median arbitrage spread in successful deals decays to zero as 
time passes, in line with the notion that risk arbitrage is akin to write uncovered index put 
options, (the prices of all non-linear derivatives are time-dependent, and options are non-linear 
derivatives [Taleb, 1997, p. 9]) See Figure 4.2. for a plot of the median arbitrage spread, which is 
identical in form to the graph of successful deal spreads presented by Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001, p. 2139) While an interesting note, this does not carry significant implications for the 
conclusions of the study.  
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4.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.2.1. Linear Regression 
 CAPM ex-post, equation 3.4., was estimated for the 132 monthly returns using the general OLS 
regression framework as described in section 2.4., the resulting output follows in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2. MVWRA returns CAPM estimation 
Dependent var. Regressor var.    
MVWRA less SSVX90 
 
OMXS30 less SSVX90  
 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 5%-level 
 
The output in Table 4.2. indicates a statistically significant alpha of basis points per month, 
or  annualised, while the beta is  for the sample. All estimations are significantly 
different from zero at the   level of confidence, albeit with a low coefficient of explanation, 
. One should not be alarmed by the latter, as it is fairly common in evaluating portfolio 
performance, for comparison, Mitchell and Pulvino‟s (2001) linear estimation produced an  of 
. Comparing Table 4.2. to the studies presented in Chapter 3, the estimated coefficients are 
not in any way exceptional, but rather in line with the findings of previous studies. The estimated 
beta is low, indicating a low dependence of MVWRA returns to market returns, as is the case in 
previous studies presented in Chapter 3, such as Branch and Yang (2005) and Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2001).  
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4.2.2. Piecewise Linear Regression 
Herein I have estimated the non-linear, piecewise linear model as given by equation 3.5., once 
again using the framework presented in section 2.4., the results from this regression are 
presented in Table 4.3. below, the threshold minimising the sum of squared residuals, 
) , was found at a ( − )-value of −0.01394.  
Table 4.3. MVWRA returns piecewise CAPM estimation (  
Dependent var. Regressor var.      
MVWRA less 
SSVX90 
MVWRA less 
SSVX90 
     
* denotes significance at the 5%-level, I denotes intercept 
Once again the regression parameters are all significantly different from zero at the level, 
this time with a higher, albeit still rather low, coefficient of explanation, . When compared to 
the linear model estimations, the results indicate a slightly lower alpha. The alpha for the whole 
estimation is , as this is the intercept of the continuous non-linear, piecewise linear 
regression line.  This amounts to  basis points per month or   annually. 
The betas come in lower in depreciating and higher appreciating markets respectively, when 
compared to the linear model. This indicates that the MVWRA returns have a higher non-
diversifiable statistical variance in appreciating markets. i.e. the market risk is greater above the 
market return threshold than below it. This observation of the beta-coefficients is especially 
noteworthy as the previously presented theory concurrently leads one to expect it to be the other 
way around, i.e. a beta closer to zero in appreciating markets and a higher positive beta in 
depreciating markets. A higher, non-zero beta in appreciating markets is, for example, seemingly 
contradictory to the results presented by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and others in sections 3.1. 
and 3.5. There could be a number of explanations for this behaviour of the sample, one being a 
right-tail bias due to the number of deals where the first bid was outbid by a competing bid, in 
favour of the arbitrageur. Other factors such as the mix of cash and stock offers in the sample 
could also be influential in this, as shown by Branch and Yang (2005). Naturally, excessively 
excluding criteria in deal selection or period selection for portfolio generation could also be 
influential factors in causing the sample to exhibit this behaviour. 
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Nevertheless, given the overwhelming support from academia in favour of left-skewed non-
linearity in risk arbitrage, I personally deem the possible explanation that risk arbitrage in 
Sweden is right-skewed non-linear to be implausible at best.  
4.2.3. Contingent Claims Evaluation using Black-Scholes 
Although the MVWRA-portfolio have not shown the same non-linear relationship with the 
market as have been indicated in previous studies, this analysis is implemented on the basis of 
assumptions. One of the central assumptions being that risk arbitrage in general is non-linearly 
related to market returns, in such a way that the strategy is akin to writing uncovered index put 
options. (as stated in section 3.3.) 
In order to capture the risks of characteristic when estimating excess return, the contingent 
claims approach using the Black-Scholes pricing framework presented in 3.3. and 3.4., is applied 
to the results in Table 4.3. Now consider equation 3.6. from earlier which is reprinted below: 
 
(3.6) 
also consider that ) and  is an invested 
amount of cash. The Black.Scholes price for the put option, , as given by 
equation 3.8., was calculated using Wolfram Alpha and for  
, ,  (SSVX90 sample average),  (OMXS30 
sample average),  month,   is equal to SEK . Inserting this value together with 
the values known from Table 4.3. into equation 3.6. yields: 
 
This means that   is SEK  more expensive than , equating to a monthly alpha of 
 basis points, or an annual excess return of . Comparatively, Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) estimated the monthly alpha to  basis points using the same method.  
The resulting annual alpha of  is markedly lower than the linear alpha of  per 
annum presented in section 4.2.1., and also lower than the non-linear, piecewise linear alpha 
estimated in section 4.2.2. This is expected as the purpose of this contingent claims approach 
Page | 38  
 
using Black-Scholes is to price the correct excess return, which takes into account the extra risks 
the risk arbitrageur is exposed to through the assumed non-linear left-skewed nature of the 
strategy.  In addition to being an intuitive result from the specification of Glosten and 
Jagannathan‟s (1994) framework, the markedly lower non-linear alpha result is consistent with 
the results presented by Branch and Yang (2005) as well as Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). 
As mentioned in section 4.2.2. the beta coefficient in depreciating markets is unexpectedly low 
given the results presented by other studies. That is, there is reason to believe that estimation 
with my MVWRA portfolio sample yields a too low beta in depreciating markets, and this 
should in fact be higher, which would have implications for the price of .
22
 While mentioning 
this, it is also important to stress the fact that the above observation does not render the 
contingent claims model incapable of functioning properly. As laid forth in Chapter 3 in general 
and section 3.3. in particular, my non-linear evaluation was undertaken on the basis of the 
assumption that risk arbitrage in general does exhibit a left-skewed non-linearity to market 
returns, an assumption based on previous research. The contingent claims Black-Scholes model 
is then constructed from that , and it will essentially work with any input-values, so long as they 
are fetched from a continuous non-linear piecewise linear regression.  That being said, what still 
stands is – as with all empirical finance – that should the assumption(s) be false, the model 
would not be accurate. 
As a final remark in this analysis, I find the monthly alpha of  basis points produced by the 
contingent claims model a far more realistic estimate of excess return for the MVWRA portfolio, 
than the linear monthly alpha of  basis points. This especially when considering the 
overwhelming academic research in favour of risk arbitrage as a strategy exhibiting option-like, 
left-skewed non-linearities.  
                                                 
22
 Increasing  in equation 3.6. will, ceteris paribus, make  cheaper, decreasing the alpha.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
Here room is given to the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the results in the previous chapter. I will 
also suggest further studies that might be undertaken on the subject. 
5.1. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this thesis has been to evaluate the ability of a risk arbitrage strategy to generate 
excess return in the Swedish market, and the objective has been to perform this evaluation using 
both linear and non-linear approaches. 
For the sample studied, 132 months starting with January 2000, the strategy have generated a 
monthly alpha of  basis points when evaluated in a linear CAPM ex-post regression, and  
basis points per month when evaluated using a non-linear, contingent claims approach. The 
results are all significant at a level of significance of . 
Hence, it can be concluded that risk arbitrage is clearly capable of generating significant excess 
returns in the Swedish market. My findings in linear evaluation are consistent with those of 
Branch and Yang (2005), Karolyi and Shannon (1998) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), who all 
conclude that risk arbitrage is capable of generating significant excess returns over extended 
periods of time. Furthermore, the non-linear evaluation exhibited a lower, albeit still significant, 
alpha, consistent with the findings of Branch and Yang (2005) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). 
There is one caveat important to stress here, and that is the fact that my MVWRA-portfolio did 
not exhibit the same non-linear characteristics in terms of beta coefficients as found by for 
example Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). Rather than being non-linearily skewed to the left, i.e. a 
higher beta in depreciating than appreciating markets, the sample exhibited a higher beta in 
appreciating markets. This would be very positive for the arbitrageur, who essentially gets a free 
lunch, risk arbitrage without the left-skewed non-linearity observed in other markets. However, 
as shown by Branch and Yang (2005), the nature of non-linearity can be highly dependent on the 
nature of the sample, and the prevalence in my sample of acquirers outbidding each other for 
target companies is most likely an influential factor.  
Conclusively, the MVWAR portfolio sample produces a significant excess return of  basis 
points per month in contingent claims evaluation, assuming Black-Scholes holds. Using a linear 
framework and assuming CAPM holds, it is concluded that the MVWRA portfolio generates a 
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significant excess return of  basis points per month. These two results are deemed to be 
overall consistent with previous studies as laid forth in Chapter 3.  
5.2. FURTHER STUDIES 
This thesis has shown that risk arbitrage have been capable of generating a significant alpha in 
the Swedish market over the last eleven years. This evaluation has however been undertaken 
under assumptions based on previous research. 
My primary suggestion for future research would be to perform a study into the actual 
characteristic of risk arbitrage in the Swedish market. Should one want to draw relevant 
conclusions on the full characteristics of risk arbitrage in said market, one would have to 
undertake a more rigorous study along the lines of that undertaken by Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001). Such a study would likely require painstaking efforts to retrieve relevant merger data, for 
a sample period that should be longer, perhaps as long as 25 to 30 years. 
Another suggestion for any further studies would be to attempt an incorporation of true 
transaction costs, such as how one moves the market when taking positions in illiquid assets, 
expenditures for shorting acquirer stocks, commission costs and other relevant costs incurred by 
the trading performed. Any further study should also consider relaxing the deal selection criteria, 
with the caveat that this would likely render the portfolio more technical to compute on several 
orders of magnitude. In fact, even in the technically advanced, peer-reviewed, studies presented 
herein, it is common to have a rather restrictive deal selection criteria similar to the one used by 
myself. For example, Mitchell and Pulvino‟s (2001) study does attempt to incorporate costs 
incurred when trading, including commissions, premium for lack of liquidity etc., they do 
however not relax deal selection criteria beyond that used by myself.   
Given the rather small number of deals over my 132 month sample when compared to some of 
studies covering the U.S. market, it is my suggestion that further research also consider including 
the whole Nordic market, even as this likely would present with currency conversion issues. This 
would present the researcher with both a larger market and a more likely theater of operations for 
a real life arbitrageur. 
Risk arbitrage represents a niche field, which undoubtedly requires a savvy practitioner in order 
to survive in the long run.  The MVWRA portfolio suffered eight days with losses exceeding five 
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percent for the full 132 month period. In a strategy where many practitioners are leveraged many 
times over, this could potentially have cataclysmic real-life implications, as argued for in section 
3.1. As such, the simulation of leverage in a portfolio should also be considered, although this 
would likely require both lengthy assumptions and rather complex simulations in order to 
generate any useful results. 
With this being said, there are evidently rewards to reap for the successful arbitrageur, and the 
field does warrant more academic research, especially in the Nordic market(s). 
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APPENDIX 
Contains data that I felt would have disrupted readability if included in the text. 
APPENDIX I: MONTHLY MVWRA RETURNS 
Below you will find each of the monthly MVWRA returns 
jan-00 0,30% okt-02 0,34% jul-05 6,00% apr-08 -0,24% 
feb-00 0,32% nov-02 0,33% aug-05 -5,66% maj-08 1,94% 
mar-00 0,34% dec-02 0,30% sep-05 -2,13% jun-08 -4,01% 
apr-00 0,33% jan-03 2,32% okt-05 -1,70% jul-08 2,00% 
maj-00 0,33% feb-03 1,49% nov-05 11,58% aug-08 0,20% 
jun-00 0,33% mar-03 4,73% dec-05 7,42% sep-08 -2,46% 
jul-00 0,34% apr-03 11,48% jan-06 10,26% okt-08 -5,23% 
aug-00 0,33% maj-03 1,20% feb-06 -0,71% nov-08 -0,37% 
sep-00 0,33% jun-03 -0,51% mar-06 0,81% dec-08 1,07% 
okt-00 0,33% jul-03 -0,30% apr-06 0,03% jan-09 -0,36% 
nov-00 2,65% aug-03 2,29% maj-06 -5,92% feb-09 -1,45% 
dec-00 3,23% sep-03 -6,78% jun-06 0,43% mar-09 -3,58% 
jan-01 0,33% okt-03 -0,50% jul-06 -2,52% apr-09 10,77% 
feb-01 0,34% nov-03 -0,46% aug-06 0,86% maj-09 3,27% 
mar-01 0,33% dec-03 1,63% sep-06 5,77% jun-09 -1,95% 
apr-01 2,64% jan-04 -0,31% okt-06 8,24% jul-09 28,05% 
maj-01 -1,05% feb-04 8,41% nov-06 -2,72% aug-09 -4,14% 
jun-01 -3,53% mar-04 0,91% dec-06 2,88% sep-09 -5,89% 
jul-01 0,00% apr-04 -3,89% jan-07 -0,26% okt-09 8,38% 
aug-01 3,63% maj-04 1,70% feb-07 -7,99% nov-09 3,60% 
sep-01 0,00% jun-04 5,40% mar-07 -1,29% dec-09 21,06% 
okt-01 3,04% jul-04 -1,80% apr-07 2,05% jan-10 1,15% 
nov-01 5,30% aug-04 10,13% maj-07 0,18% feb-10 -6,37% 
dec-01 2,39% sep-04 2,82% jun-07 -5,80% mar-10 14,40% 
jan-02 -1,03% okt-04 0,68% jul-07 -0,29% apr-10 -1,62% 
feb-02 -0,52% nov-04 0,94% aug-07 11,28% maj-10 -1,81% 
mar-02 6,54% dec-04 1,23% sep-07 12,19% jun-10 6,89% 
apr-02 -0,36% jan-05 -0,99% okt-07 -2,40% jul-10 0,66% 
maj-02 0,55% feb-05 0,54% nov-07 -0,69% aug-10 -1,85% 
jun-02 -0,01% mar-05 0,00% dec-07 -1,46% sep-10 6,69% 
jul-02 0,82% apr-05 -2,23% jan-08 0,38% okt-10 0,66% 
aug-02 0,35% maj-05 1,91% feb-08 1,91% nov-10 -2,36% 
sep-02 0,35% jun-05 6,03% mar-08 0,61% dec-10 -0,14% 
 
